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Rotating 
the boards
Can companies resolve 
groupthink issues and improve 
their performance by turning 
over their boards more often, ask 
Mark Rogers and Amir Satvat.
The notion that members of a decision-making group may become overly cohe-sive and suffer from so-called ‘groupthink’ is commonplace in psychology and man-
agement. Equally, the recent corporate scandals in 
both the US and UK have drawn attention to the role 
of ‘hubris’ in distorting decision-making. Despite 
this, little attention has been devoted to assessing 
how corporate boards can guard against groupthink. 
This study puts forward an idea about the optimal 
rate of board turnover – the board rotation princi-
ple – as a result of testing the impact of groupthink 
by analysing data on a sample of US consumer firms 
(1994-98). The basic hypothesis used for the research 
was that low levels of board rotation may increase 
the chances of groupthink and, subsequently, poor 
performance for the companies involved. 
Intuition would also suggest that high board rota-
tion may also have adverse effects, as experience and 
continuity may be disrupted. The empirical results 
confirm these thoughts: performance appears to be 
higher for those firms that have intermediate levels 
of board rotation. However, this result is only found 
when we use future profitability as a performance 
measure; using current Tobin’s q as a proxy for future 
performance does not uncover such a relationship.
linking board rotation and performance
Our study used empirical methodology to analyse 
the link between board rotation and performance in 
a sample of 37 consumer companies in the S&P 500 
index. The test was motivated by the most basic solu-
tion to groupthink, namely, to regularly introduce 
new group members, which in the present context 
means new board members. 
Using data on board size and board turnover, we 
constructed a measure of board rotation (the propor-
tion of the board that is replaced each year). Since the 
possibility of groupthink should be lower when board 
rotation is higher, this provides a method of testing 
for the influence of groupthink. 
Since there appears to be no previous empirical analy-
sis on the link between board rotation and performance, 
the paper proceeded in a specific way. First, we consid-
ered only S&P500 consumer companies as these repre-
sent firms in an established and relatively stable industry 
which attract substantial stockmarket analysis. 
Second, we analysed the years between 1995 and 
1998, before a period of rapid share price growth. 
Third, we considered both a stockmarket measure 
of performance (Tobin’s q) and a forward looking 
profitability measure (the average Earnings Before 
Depreciation Interest and Taxes or EBDIT, margin over 
the next four years). Last, we used a range of empirical 
methodologies, varying from simple summary statis-
tics to simultaneous equation models.
The data shows that the mean board rotation was 
8.6 per cent, or one director, in any given year. However, 
there was substantial variation across firms, with 
around 40 per cent of companies retaining the same 
board over two years and one firm where 60 per cent 
of directors left within a year. This large variation is 
thought provoking, since one might expect such large 
differences in board structures to have some effect on 
decision-making and, in turn, performance. 
An analysis of the mean and median Tobin’s q 
across firms reveals that firms with the lowest 
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board rotation have the highest q. This is most strik-
ing when we take a four-year average of q for each 
firm, finding that firms in the lowest quintile of 
board rotation have a q of 2.8 while firms in the top 
quintile have a q of 1.4. This sug-
gests that the sharemarket places a premium on 
board continuity, which implies that experience and 
stability are dominant factors in achieving optimal 
business decisions.
Put another way, the sharemarket appears uncon-
cerned about the possibility of groupthink, at least 
to the extent that board rotation may be necessary 
to prevent its effects. The situation was, however, 
considerably different if we used future profitability 
as a performance measure. In this case the analysis 
showed that firms with relatively high board rotation, 
namely three directors a year (between 8.6 and 14.6 
per cent over four years), achieved the highest EBDIT 
margin (as measured by the mean or median). Thus 
there is some evidence that the lack of board rotation, 
and by assumption the presence of groupthink, may 
adversely affect profitability.
A drawback of the simple statistical analysis dis-
cussed here is that it cannot control for third factors 
or potential reverse causation. The latter may be par-
ticularly important: this paper is based on the hypoth-
esis that board rotation can affect firm performance, 
but performance could affect rotation. 
In fact, there is a literature that finds that poor per-
formance raises CEO turnover. We tested for a per-
formance to board rotation effect in our sample and 
found that some reverse causation did occur, with poor 
profitability in previous years raising board rotation. 
However, the magnitude of this effect was rela-
tively small. In addition, if reverse causation was 
present it would tend to reduce the magnitude 
of any positive effects running between board 
rotation and performance that we found (since 
the negative performance-to-rotation mecha-
nism would tend to offset any positive board 
rotation-to-performance relationship).
The regression analysis finds that a simul-
taneous equations model performed 
poorly with the limited data avail-
able, although it did indicate 
that reverse causation was 
not an important mecha-
nism. Given this, the anal-
ysis utilised a simple ordi-
nary least squares (OLS) 
regression analysis in which 
we controlled for other poten-
tial determinants of perform-
ance (such as the number of exter-
nal directors, firm size, intangibles 
and past growth). 
The results indicated that 
there was no significant partial correlation 
between Tobin’s q and board rotation. However, using 
future profitability as a performance measure the anal-
ysis again found that firms with relatively high board 
rotation between 8.6 per cent and 14.6 per cent per-
formed better than average. The magnitude of the 
effect suggested that such firms had a 6 per cent higher 
EDBIT margin than average. This gives rise to the idea 
of a ‘board rotation principle’ where firms endeavour 
to replace board members at this rate.
While this paper has provided some important 
evidence of the role of board rotation in performance, 
future research needs to test a larger data set. 
What	is	groupthink?
Irving	Janis	defined	groupthink	in	1982	
as	the	“deterioration	of	mental	efficiency,	
reality	testing	and	moral	judgment	in	
the	interest	of	group	solidarity”.	Most	
famously,	in	his	1972	study	of	US	foreign	
policy,	Janis	noted	that	some	of	the	
worst	decisions	appeared	to	be	linked	
to	groupthink.	Groupthink	occurs	when	
the	members	of	the	group	become	overly	
concerned	about	cohesiveness,	rejecting	
dissent	within	the	group	and	paying	
little	attention	to	external	views.	In	some	
ways,	therefore,	groupthink	is	‘hubris’	of	
the	group,	rather	than	an	individual.
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